Sino-Indian Standoff: Where is to distend

Its 564 days have been passed since the first Sino-India clash on May 20, 2020 but experts are not in a position to state much, as to where will it go. At the establishment level, the two sides are building their best to combat any unsolicited situation, while on the diplomatic front also, all is not well, though it hasn’t closed as well. Despite the 13 rounds of local core commander level talks gone unconcluded, except one in which China and India created a buffer zone at Pangong Tso in February and Gogra area in August 2021. However, in the Ladakh sector, outstanding problems at Hot Springs and Depsang are yet to be resolved. The Indian Army’s patrolling activity has been affected in Hot Springs (Patrolling Point (PP)-15) and PLA’s forward presence in Depsang has also hindered access of Indian soldiers to routes including the ones leading to PP-10, 11, 11-A, 12, and 13. Nevertheless, in the last (13^th) round talk, which occurred on October 10, this year has failed and two sides blamed each other. Interestingly, the Chinese mouthpiece, Global Times has taunted citing experts “India wants the status quo as it was before 1962”, while New Delhi’s consistent demand is to maintain the status quo ante of Apr 2020. However, the next core commander-level talk is expected in the latter half of this month, which too should not be expected to give any breakthrough, especially when both sides are enhancing their buildups for this winter.

1. Condition as of now: A stalemate at equilibrium.

Both sides are prepared for any hostile condition and this preparation is growing rapidly. Though the two countries had fought only one war, in 1962. But simmering tensions involve the risk of escalation – and that can be devastating given both sides are established nuclear powers. There would also be an economic fallout as China is one of India’s biggest trading partners. However, looking at the Chinese ‘book of war’ it is highly unlikely to predict anything. Observers say talks are the only way forward because both countries have much to lose.

The Deployments On Both Sides:

India-Redrawing Army’s command boundaries along the China border step towards creating theater commands

The redrawing of the boundaries of the Indian Army’s commands looking after the China border is a step towards the creation of theater commands and this will help in better management of the resources. The Indian Army recently brought the entire border along the China border in Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand under the Lucknow-based Central Command. As we move towards the creation of new theater commands, this referring to boundaries and responsibilities of the operational commands was important. The China border was earlier looked after by the Northern, Western, Central, and Eastern commands will now be managed by 3 commands only. The Indian Army has also increased the allocation of forces for the northern and eastern fronts with China as an additional corps with armored division has been given responsibility in the Ladakh area. While the eastern front has also been provided with a full-fledged Mountain Strike Corps to thwart any misadventure in the Arunachal sector by the Chinese Army.

It is not just in eastern Ladakh that China has become aggressive, but also in the Eastern Sector where the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) seeks to test India’s ability to defend the Line of Actual Control (LAC) “almost every fortnight”. However, due to India’s increased focus on technology-backed surveillance techniques. Citing the source ThePrint reported that India is keeping track of Chinese build-up in-depth areas as well as at LAC and fine-tuning its operational plans accordingly. However, the Indian defense establishment is concerned over China’s speeding up its infrastructure development activities close to the LAC across the Eastern Sector.[ThePrint]

Eastern Sector heavily defended: Unlike Eastern Ladakh, (Wild West) where the near impossibility to deploy soldiers on every piece of land, the Eastern Sector is more heavily defended since the troops are sitting right at the LAC at many locations. The northern sector (1,500-km-long LAC) is taken care of by a single division, the Leh-based 14 Corps which takes care of border areas with both Pakistan and Tibet, while Eastern Sector (1346 km), is looked after by 3 Corps plus 17 Mountain Strike Corps (offensive operations).

In Arunachal Pradesh itself, 2 Corps— the Tezpur-based 4 Corps (the western part of Arunachal) and the Dimapur-based 3 Corps (eastern Arunachal). It is not as if the areas under the 4 Corps are calm, as there are about 15-16 places under the 4 Corps (the Gajraj Corps), where the Chinese attempt to transgress. The 4 Corps is in charge of the areas between Bumla to Yangste (3807) and some of these points see transgression attempts by the Chinese every fortnight.

Beefed-up surveillance: India also has beefed up its presence at the LAC with some formations being deployed ahead of where they were traditionally based as the Eastern Command has also upgraded its firepower with the induction of the Bofors guns last year and the M777 lightweight howitzers this year. Along with this, the Eastern Command has also deployed the upgraded L-70 air defense systems this year besides others already in use in the region. Specialized missiles have also been deployed besides Smerch and Pinaka rocket systems besides setting up of forwarding helicopter bases. The Eastern Command has also set up integrated surveillance facilities which rely on almost 24×7 drone and satellite feeds to keep track of the Chinese build-up.

Sharp rise in Chinese activity after Galwan clash: “There was a sharp increase in Chinese patrolling activities in number (from 12 & 20 to 60) and size in the Eastern Sector, after the Galwan clash. There were also visits by senior PLA officers including by the Western Theatre Commander.” The increase in patrolling activities by the PLA has more or less stabilized and is “almost back to pre-Galwan” days. Area domination patrols entail a larger number of PLA troops backed by armored personnel carriers. Such an increase in PLA activities was observed across sectors-sources said.

The Western Theatre Command is geographically the largest theatre command within China and is responsible for responding to conflict with India and terrorist and insurgent threats in western China. PLA units located within the Western Theatre Command include two group armies, two military districts, three air force bases, and one rocket force base. PAP units responsible for Xinjiang operations are also likely under the control of the Western Theater Command, a report by the US Defence Department said.

There is abundant evidence, from online social media releases of the PLA and state-controlled media, that the Chinese military has intensified efforts to modernize ground units in the Xinjiang Military District, a part of the Western Theater Command.

The latter boasts some 90,000-120,000 ground troops, principally divided into the 76^th and 77^th Group Armies (headquartered in the interior cities of Chongqing and Baoji respectively), according to research by the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University in the USA.

The district itself contains some 50,000-60,000 army troops, (Dennis Blasko, a former US Army attache to Beijing and Hong Kong) and 70,000 ground troops (Belfer Center). Whichever figure is true, the fact is that Xinjiang Military District owns more troops than Tibet does, which controls an estimated 40,000 soldiers.

The district: 3 motorized infantry divisions (the 4^th, 8^th, and 11^th Motorized Infantry Divisions); the 6^th Mechanized Infantry Division; a special operations brigade; the 2^nd Artillery Brigade; a “high-powered artillery brigade; 2 infantry regiments (the 1^st and 2^nd Independent Regiments); the 13^th Air Defense Brigade; an engineer regiment; the 3^rd Aviation Brigade; an intelligence/ reconnaissance brigade; and additional logistics units.

There are also 2 border defense regiments (12^th and 13^th Border Defense Regiments). The PLARF has 646 Brigades near Korla, which was known to have DF-21C medium-range ballistic missiles, but it seems likely the brigade has been re-equipped with the DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile. PLA units are dispersed widely around Xinjiang, China’s largest province that spans a staggering 1.6 million km².

Right up till last year, these units were predominantly equipped with older equipment such as Type 88 main battle tanks, Type 63 armored personnel carriers, and elderly towed artillery pieces. These are in no way cutting edge, especially compared to some of the flashy new gear appearing in other combined arms brigades in more favored PLA units and theaters.

Most recently, in May, delivery of new PHL-03 multiple rocket launchers was reported. These 8×8 truck-based rocket launchers were likely delivered to the “high-powered” artillery brigade since the PHL-03 is a key artillery system in the PLA. Video footage revealed 10 such PHL-03 MRLs arrayed at a commissioning ceremony, along with 4 trans-loader vehicles and 4 support trucks. Just 3 months earlier, the PCL-181 self-propelled howitzer arrived in Xinjiang. An even more sophisticated artillery piece for the PLA, the PCL-181 is mounted on a 6×6 truck chassis and it boasts a 155mm-caliber gun. This type of mobile, wheeled system would be distributed to artillery brigades to again replace obsolete towed howitzers.

Artillery systems like the PHL-03, PCL-161 and PCL-181 enjoy greater digitization than their predecessors. They are typically accompanied by command-and-control and reconnaissance vehicles, as well as medium-altitude drones in the air. This networked capability results in targeting and fire missions that are far more precise. Taken together, then, these new artillery assets are critical to beefing up the PLA in China’s far west.

Instead of older vehicles like the tracked Type 63 armored personnel carrier, footage of the much more modern ZBL-09 8×8 infantry fighting vehicle with a 30mm cannon was finally released in May. This Type 09 family of combat vehicles is diverse, with all kinds of variants in service, but the 8×8 wheeled vehicle allows units to move quickly by road.

The Z-20, a blatant copy of the American Black Hawk platform, is the newest addition to the PLA helicopter fleet. It was designed for optimal performance at high altitudes, making it well suited to flying in Xinjiang and Tibet. The Z-8G, meanwhile, represents the latest generation of the long-serving Z-8 helicopter family.

The Nanjiang (Southern Xinjiang) Military District is responsible for the Aksai Chin area along the Indian border. The 6th Mechanized Infantry Division with 10,000-13,000 personnel is important since it is the closest to Aksai Chin, the location where last year’s Galwan Valley bloodbath occurred. Notably, only one Chinese highway (called G219) leads into the area. Once border defense and other services like the PLA Air Force and PLA Rocket Force are included, the Western Theater Command possesses some 235,000 personnel.

Of course, China may be waging a carefully calculated propaganda campaign to intimidate neighbors like India. It may be that the new equipment is not reaching Xinjiang in large numbers and that its arrival in small batches of equipment is simply being milked to maximum effect. Also, outsiders can only as much as Beijing want them to know.

“All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when we are able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must appear inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.”― Sun Tzu

Background of Problem: India looks at ‘early resolution’, while China says agreement reached

China and India have agreed to come up with more measures to contain tensions on their disputed border after the failure of the most recent military talks on disengagement. During a virtual meeting of the WMCC on Sino-Indian Border Affairs, senior officials from the two neighbors also agreed to continue communication through diplomatic and military channels for another round of commander-level talks aimed at agreeing to a full disengagement, the Chinese foreign ministry said. The two sides would “continue their efforts to promote further de-escalation of the border situation and strive to move from emergency management to regular control as soon as possible”, its statement said.[SCMP]

Among other articles warning of increased tension, one article on a PLA-maintained website on last Dec 24 claimed the Indian Army is “waiting for an opportunity to cause trouble next year”. It said China and India “have prepared for a long-term confrontation in the disputed border area” and “it is expected to continue for several years”. It advised the PLA to move more mechanized units into the area by the beginning of spring, averring that “military deterrence is always more important than negotiation”. It added, “India must be the one that pays the greater price. India will waste decades on the misjudgment of Modi and Jaishankar’s strategy”.

What’s the bigger picture?

The two countries are struggling for their influence on the world stage, as there won’t be any explainable reason for the current crisis. However, the visible root cause is an ill-defined, 3,440 km (2,100-mile)-long disputed border. During his visit to China in May 2015, PM Narendra Modi’s proposal to clarify the LAC was rejected by the Chinese, and not rocket science to understand this. No country at its peak of growth will finalize any disputed issue, which closes the door to grow further.

The two countries have fought only one war, in 1962, when India suffered a humiliating defeat.

But simmering tensions involve the risk of escalation – and that can be devastating given both sides are established nuclear powers. There would also be an economic fallout as China is one of India’s biggest trading partners.[BBC]

The military stand-off is mirrored by growing political tension, which has strained ties between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Observers say talks are the only way forward because both countries have much to lose.

In a 33-page article titled ‘The behavioral logic behind India’s tough foreign policy toward China”, in the latest issue of CICIR’s official publication, Hu Shisheng asserted the conflict in Ladakh was “inevitable” and a result of the “high-risk, high-yield” policy followed by the Modi government.

At the least, the articles reflect the views of China’s intelligence establishment. At the tactical level, he and other Chinese commentators anticipate higher levels of tension with the likelihood of clashes in the current year.

Experts opinion on the current standoff: Stalemate an opportunity for China?

China experts and policy wonks have said there is no sign of drawing down the stalemate, and both armies are prepared for the extended deployment of additional troops brought into the region.

“The eight rounds so far have not yielded full disengagement and de-escalation,” Srikanth Kondapalli, a professor of Chinese studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University in Delhi, told DW.

DW cited Alka Acharya, (former director, Institute of Chinese Studies in Delhi), although talks are important for avoiding a larger conflict, neither side wants to be seen as backing down.

“A high degree of nationalist sentiment has been generated, which will be a further retardant on any conciliatory gestures,” Acharya added.

Brahma  Chellaney said reports have been coming in from the grassroots over many years that the Chinese are slowly encroaching into the areas of Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh, in particular. Talking about the significance of the report from the Pentagon, which said that 100s of Chinese villages have been constructed in Arunachal, he said there is a law that provides legitimacy to such a strategy. This law — the land borders law, clearly specifies state support for establishing civilian border settlements, as is already happening along the Himalayan borders with India, with Bhutan, and even with Nepal. This law specifically calls for strengthening the building of mass defense groups.

However, there are many controversial statements in media regarding ‘these villages’, as CDS says it’s not on our side, while others claimed that it’s 3 km inside the Indian territory, as per the Mc Mohan line, which China doesn’t accept. Keeping controversies asides, a matter of fact China has finally grasped the region, forever. As per the report, a village of a 100-home in disputed territory between the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh and Tibet has turned the spotlight on India’s concerns about a push by China to create civilian settlements along their disputed Himalayan border.

Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (R) has written in Apr this year, –We have stalemated the Chinese and denied them absolute victory. But Depsang Plains and Gogra-Hot Springs continue to remain our vulnerabilities and we have no counter-military leverage. It may be prudent to diffuse the crisis by negotiating buffer zones in these critical areas even if these entirely are on our side of the LAC. It may appear to be “unfavorable peace” but given our vulnerabilities, it is the best we can hope for.

So where the current stalemate can go:

Of course, no easy answer is with an expert, except chewing and mincing the words can’t lead anyone anywhere. In the very first place, no political solution is looking, experts say both countries have a lot to loos if it goes towards Armey conflicts as full-fledged war. Lakhs of troops are with a gun facing each other within firing range in hostile climatic conditions. Far from any signs of an end to the military stand-off between India and China, or that tensions between the two will ease, China’s mood towards India is hardening. The current confrontation could presage a period of sustained, protracted pressure on India. Well-informed Chinese analysts now suggest that the military confrontation in the Himalayas is likely to escalate. Hu Shisheng assessed that the contest over the border will move from “reconciliation through dialogues” to a new stage featuring “contention for control with real power”, which will inevitably lead to border clashes. However, in the case of war, there is a substantial difference between the capabilities of the two countries. As per an estimate of an independent agency, in 2020, the defanse budget of China was $343 bn while India had sepnt only $73 bn. But of course, Beijing has more front to manage as India has 2 fronts.